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Abstract—We study the problem of power allocation over two
identical Gilbert-Elliot communication channels. Our goal is to
maximize the expected discounted number of bits transmitted
over an infinite time horizon. This is achieved by choosing
among three possible strategies: (1) betting on channel 1 by
allocating all the power to this channel, which results in high
data rate if channel 1 happens to be in good state, and zero
bits transmitted if channel 1 is in bad state (even if channel
2 is in good state) (2) betting on channel 2 by allocating all
the power to the second channel, and (3) a balanced strategy
whereby each channel is allocated half the total power, with
the effect that each channel can transmit a low data rate if it
is in good state. We assume that each channel’s state is only
revealed upon transmission of data on that channel. We model
this problem as a partially observable Markov decision processes
(MDP), and derive key threshold properties of the optimal policy.
Further, we show that by formulating and solving a relevant
linear program the thresholds can be determined numerically
when system parameters are known.
I. INTRODUCTION
Adaptive power control is an important technique to select
the transmission power of a wireless system according to
channel condition to achieve better network performance in
terms of higher data rate or spectrum efficiency [1], [2]. While
there has been some recent work on power allocation over
stochastic channels [3], [4], [5], the problem of optimal adap-
tive power allocation across multiple stochastic channels with
memory is challenging and poorly understood. In this paper,
we analyze a simple but fundamental problem. We consider
a wireless system operating on two stochastically identical
independent parallel transmission channels, each modeled as
a slotted Gilber-Elliott channel (i.e. described by two-state
Markov chains, with a bad state “0” and a good state “1”).
Our objective is to allocate the limited power budget to the
two channels dynamically so as to maximize the expected
discounted number of bits transmitted over time. Since the
channel state is unknown when power allocation decision is
made, this problem is more challenging than it looks like.
Recently, several works have explored different sequen-
tial decision-making problems involving Gilbert-Elliott chan-
nels [6], [7], [8], [9], [10]. In [6], [7], the authors consider
selecting one channel to sense/access at each time among
several identical channels, formulate it as a restless multi-
armed problem, and show that a simple myopic policy is
optimal whenever the channels are positively correlated over
time. In [8], the authors study the problem of dynamically
choosing one of three transmitting schemes for a single
Gilbert-Elliott channel in an attempt to maximize the expected
discounted number of bits transmitted. And in [9], the authors
study the problem of choosing a transmitting strategy from
two choices emphasizing the case when the channel transition
probabilities are unknown. While similar in spirit to these
two studies, our work addresses a more challenging setting
involving two independent channels. A more related two-
channel problem is studied in [10], which characterizes the
optimal policy to opportunistically access two non-identical
Gilber-Elliott channels (generalizing the prior work on sensing
policies for identical channels [6], [7]). While we address only
identical channels in this work, the strategy space explored
here is richer because in our formulation of power allocation,
it is possible to use both channels simultaneously whilst in
[6], [7], [10] only one channel is accessed in each time slot.
In this paper, we formulate our power allocation problem as
a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP). We
then treat the POMDP as a continuous state MDP and develop
the structure of the optimal policy (decision). Our main
contributions are the following: (1) we formulate the problem
of dynamic power allocation over parallel Markovian channels,
(2) using the MDP theory, we theoretically prove key threshold
properties of the optimal policy for this particular problem,
(3) through simulation based on linear programming, we
demonstrate the existence of the 0-threshold and 2-threshold
structures of the optimal policy, and (4) we demonstrate how to
numerically compute the thresholds and construct the optimal
policy when system parameters are known.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Channel model and assumptions
We consider a wireless communication system operating on
two parallel channels. Each channel is described by a slotted
Gilbert-Elliott model which is a one dimensional Markov
chain Gi,t(i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ {1, 2, ...,∞}) with two states: a
good state denoted by 1 and a bad state denoted by 0 (i is the
channel number and t is the time slot). The channel transition
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probabilities are given by Pr[Gi,t = 1|Gi,t−1 = 1] = λ1, i ∈
{1, 2} and Pr[Gi,t = 1|Gi,t−1 = 0] = λ0, i ∈ {1, 2}. We
assume the two channels are identical and independent of each
other, and channel transitions occur at the beginning of each
time slot. We also assume that λ0 ≤ λ1, which is the positive
correlation assumption commonly used in the literature.
The system has a total transmission power of P . At the
beginning of time slot t, the system allocates transmission
power P1(t) to channel 1 and P2(t) to channel 2, where
P1(t) + P2(t) = P . We assume the channel state is not
directly observable at the beginning of each time slot. That
is, the system needs to allocate the transmission power to
the two parallel channels without knowing the channel states.
If channel i(i ∈ {1, 2}) is used at time slot t by allocating
transmission power Pi(t) on it, the channel state of the elapsed
slot is revealed at the end of the time slot through channel
feedback. But if a channel is not used, that is, if transmission
power is 0 on that channel, the channel state of the elapsed
slot remains unknown at the end of that slot.
B. Power allocation strategies
To simplify the problem, we assume the system may allocate
one of the following three power levels to a channel: 0, P/2, or
P . That is, based on the belief in the channel state of channel
i for the current time slot t, the system may decide to give up
the channel (Pi(t) = 0), use it moderately (Pi(t) = P/2) or
use it fully(Pi(t) = P ). Since the channel state is not directly
observable when the power allocation is done, the following
circumstances may occur. If a channel is in bad state, no data
is transmitted at all no matter what the allocated power is. If
a channel is in good state, and power P/2 is allocated to it, it
can transmit Rl bits of data successfully during that slot. If a
channel is in good condition and power P is allocated to it, it
can transmit Rh bits of data successfully during that slot. We
assume Rl < Rh < 2Rl.
We define three power allocation strategies(actions): bal-
anced, betting on channel 1, and betting on channel 2. Each
strategy is explained in detail as follows.
Balanced: For this action (denoted by Bb), the system
allocates the transmission power evenly on both channels, that
is, P1(t) = P2(t) = P/2, for time slot t. This corresponds to
the situation when the system cannot determine which of the
channels is more likely to be in good state, so it decides to
“play safe” by using both of the channels.
Betting on channel 1: For this action (denoted by B1), the
system decides to “gamble” and allocate all the transmission
power to channel 1. That is, P1(t) = P, P2(t) = 0 for time slot
t. This corresponds to the situation when the system believes
that channel 1 is in a good state and channel 2 is in a bad
state.
Betting on channel 2: For this action (denoted by B2), the
system put all the transmission power in channel 2, that is,
P2(t) = P, P1(t) = 0 for time slot t.
Note that for strategies B1 and B2, if a channel is not used,
the system (transmitter) will not acquire any knowledge about
the state of that channel during the elapsed slot.
C. POMDP formulation
At the beginning of a time slot, the system is confronted
with a choice among three actions. It must judiciously select
actions so as to maximize the total expected discounted
number of bits transmitted over an infinite time span. Because
the state of the channels is not directly observable, the problem
in hand is a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP). In [11], it is shown that a sufficient statistic for
determining the optimal policy is the conditional probability
that the channel is in the good state at the beginning of the
current slot given the past history (henceforth called belief)
[8]. Denote the belief of the system by a two dimension
vector xt=(x1,t, x2,t), where x1,t = Pr[G1,t = 1|~t], x2,t =
Pr[G2,t = 1|~t], where ~t is all the history of actions and
observations at the current slot t. By using this belief as the
decision variable, the POMDP problem is converted into an
MDP with the uncountable state space ([0, 1], [0, 1]) [8].
Define a policy pi as a rule that dictates the action to
choose, i.e., a map from the belief at a particular time to
an action in the action space. Let V pi(p) be the expected
discounted reward with initial belief p = (p1, p2), that is,
x1,0 = Pr[G1,0 = 1|~0] = p1, x2,0 = Pr[G2,0 = 1|~0] = p2,
where the superscript pi denotes the policy being followed. De-
fine β(∈ [0, 1)) as the discount factor, the expected discounted
reward has the following expression
V pi(p) = Epi[
∞∑
t=0
βtgat(xt)|x0 = p], (1)
where Epi represents the expectation given that the policy pi
is employed, t is the time slot index, at is the action chosen
at time t, at ∈ {Bb, B1, B2}. The term gat(xt) denotes the
expected reward acquired when the belief is xt and the action
at is chosen:
gat(xt) =
 x1,tRl + x2,tRl, if at = Bbx1,tRh, if at = B1
x2,tRh, if at = B2
.
(2)
Now we define the value function V (p) as
V (p) = max
pi
V pi(p), for all p ∈ ([0, 1], [0, 1]). (3)
A policy is said to be stationary if it is a function mapping the
state space ([0, 1], [0, 1]) into the action space {Bb, B1, B2}.
Ross proved in [12] (Th.6.3) that there exists a stationary
policy pi∗ such that V (p) = V pi
∗
(p). The value function V (p)
satisfies the Bellman equation
V (p) = max
a∈{Bb,B1,B2}
{Va(p)}, (4)
where Va(p) is the value acquired by taking action a when
the initial belief is p. Va(p) is given by
Va(p) = ga(p) + βE
y[V (y)|x0 = p, a0 = a], (5)
where y denotes the next belief when the action a is chosen
and the initial belief is p. The term Va(p) is explained next
for the three possible actions.
a) Balanced (action Bb): If this action is taken, and the
current belief is p = (p1, p2), the immediate reward is p1Rl+
p2Rl. Since both channels are used, the channel quality of
both channels during the current slot is then revealed to the
transmitter. With probability p1 the first channel will be in
good state and hence the belief of channel 1 at the beginning
of the next slot will be λ1. Likewise, with probability 1− p1
channel 1 will turn out to be in bad state and hence the updated
belief of channel 1 for the next slot is λ0. Since channel 2 and
channel 1 are identical, channel 2 has similar belief update.
Consequently if action Bb is taken, the value function evolves
as
VBb(p1, p2)
= p1Rl + p2Rl + β[(1− p1)(1− p2)V (λ0, λ0)
+ p1(1− p2)V (λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)p2V (λ0, λ1)
+ p1p2V (λ1, λ1)]. (6)
b) Betting on channel 1( action B1): If this action is taken,
and the current belief is p = (p1, p2), the immediate reward
is p1Rh. But since channel 2 is not used, its channel state
remains unknown. Hence if the belief of channel 2 during the
elapsed time slot is p2, its belief at the beginning of the next
time slot is given by
T (p2) = p2λ1 + (1− p2)λ0 = αp2 + λ0, (7)
where α = λ1 − λ0. Consequently, if this action is taken, the
value function evolves as
VB1(p1, p2) = p1Rh +
β[(1− p1)V (λ0, T (p2)) + p1V (λ1, T (p2))]. (8)
c) Betting on channel 2(action B2): Similar to action B1, if
action B2 is taken, the value function evolves as
VB2(p1, p2) = p2Rh +
β[(1− p2)V (T (p1), λ0) + p2V (T (p1), λ1)], (9)
where
T (p1) = p1λ1 + (1− p1)λ0 = αp1 + λ0. (10)
Finally the Bellman equation for our power allocation problem
reads as follows
V (p) = max{VBb(p), VB1(p), VB2(p)}. (11)
III. STRUCTURE OF THE OPTIMAL POLICY
From the above discussion we understand that an optimal
policy exists for our power allocation problem. In this section,
we try to derive the optimal policy by first looking at the
features of its structure.
A: Properties of value function
Lemma 1. VBi(p1, p2), i ∈ {1, 2, b} is affine with respect to
p1 and p2 and the following equalities hold:
VBi(cp+ (1− c)p′, p2) = cVBi(p, p2) + (1− c)VBi(p′, p2),
VBi(p1, cp+ (1− c)p′) = cVBi(p1, p) + (1− c)VBi(p1, p′), (12)
where 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 is a constant; and we say f(x) is affine with
respect to x if f(x) = a+ cx, with constant a and c.
Proof:
It is clear that VBb is affine in p1 and p2 from (6). It is also
obvious that VB1 is affine in p1 and VB2 is affine in p2 from
(8) and (9). Next we will prove that VB1 is affine in p2 and
VB2 is affine in p1, which will make the proof complete.
Now we prove that VB1 is affine in p2. We will first show
that the second term on the right side of (8) is affine in p2, the
third term can then be shown to be affine in p2 in a similar
manner, thus the summation of the three terms in (8) is affine
in p2.
Now let us look at the second term on the right side of
(8), the main part V (λ0, T (p2)) is one of the following three
forms: VBb(λ0, T (p2)), VB2(λ0, T (p2)), or VB1(λ0, T (p2)).
The first form VBb(λ0, T (p2)) is affine in p2 because
VBb(λ0, T (p2)) is affine in T (p2) and T (p2) = αp2 + λ0
is affine in p2. Similarly, the second form VB2(λ0, T (p2))
is affine in T (p2) thus affine in p2. The third form
VB1(λ0, T (p2)) is written as:
VB1(λ0, T (p2))
= λ0Rh + βλ0V (λ1, T
2(p2)) + β(1− λ0)V (λ0, T 2(p2)),
(13)
where Tn(p) = T (Tn−1(p)) = λ01−α (1 − αn) + αnp.
Since Tn(p2) is affine in p2, (13) is affine in p2 as
soon as V (λ1, Tn(p2)) takes the form of VBb(λ1, T
n(p2))
or VB2(λ1, T
n(p2)), and V (λ0, T 2(p2)) takes the form of
VBb(λ0, T
n(p2)) or VB2(λ0, T
n(p2)), n = 2, 3, 4, ..., which
is affine in p2. If V (λ1, Tn(p2)) continues to take the form
VB1(λ1, T
n(p2)) till n goes to infinity, V (λ1, Tn(p2)) will
eventually become a constant V (λ1, λ01−α ) because T
n(p2)→
λ0
1−α , n → ∞. Which means a special case of affine linearity
in p2. With this we show that the third form VB1(λ0, T (p2))
is affine in p2. Therefore we have shown that V (λ0, T (p2)) is
affine in p2, thus the second term on the right side of (8) is
affine in p2.
Similarly we can show that the third term on the right side
of (8) is affine in p2, thus VB1(p1, p2) is affine in p2.
The affine linearity of VB2(p1, p2) in p1 can be proved using
the same technique and the detail is omitted due to space limit.
Lemma 2. VBi(p1, p2), i ∈ {1, 2, b} is convex in p1 and p2.
Proof: The convexity of VBi , i ∈ {1, 2, b} in p1 and p2
follows from its affine linearity in Lemma 1.
Lemma 3. V (p1, p2) = V (p2, p1), that is, V (p1, p2) is
symmetric with respect to the line p1 = p2 in the belief space.
Proof: Define V n(p1, p2) as the optimal value when the
decision horizon spans only n stages. Then we have
V 1(p1, p2)
= max{V 1Bb(p1, p2), V 1B1(p1, p2), V 1B2(p1, p2)}
= max{p1Rl + p2Rl, p1Rh, p2Rh}. (14)
V 1(p2, p1)
= max{V 1Bb(p2, p1), V 1B1(p2, p1), V 1B2(p2, p1)}
= max{p2Rl + p1Rl, p2Rh, p1Rh}. (15)
It is easy to see that
V 1(p1, p2) = V
1(p2, p1). (16)
Assume V k(x1, x2) = V k(x2, x1), k ≥ 1, next we will prove
that V k+1(p1, p2) = V k+1(p2, p1).
V k+1Bb (p1, p2)
= p1Rl + p2Rh + β[(1− p1)(1− p2)V k(λ0, λ0)
+ p1(1− p2)V k(λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)p2V k(λ0, λ1)
+ p1p2V
k(λ1, λ1)] (17)
V k+1B1 (p1, p2) = p1Rh +
β[(1− p1)V k(λ0, T (p2)) + p1V k(λ1, T (p2))]. (18)
V k+1B2 (p1, p2) = p2Rh +
β[(1− p2)V k(T (p1), λ0) + p2V k(T (p1), λ1)]. (19)
Using the assumption that V k(x1, x2) = V k(x2, x1), it is easy
to see that
V k+1B1 (p2, p1)
= p2Rh + β[(1− p2)V k(λ0, T (p1)) + p2V k(λ1, T (p1))]
= p2Rh + β[(1− p2)V k(T (p1), λ0) + p2V k(T (p1), λ1)]
= V k+1B2 (p1, p2) (20)
Similarly, we have V k+1B2 (p2, p1) = V
k+1
B1
(p1, p2), and
V k+1Bb (p2, p1) = V
k+1
Bb
(p1, p2), thus
V k+1(p1, p2)
= max{V k+1Bb (p1, p2), V k+1B1 (p1, p2), V k+1B2 (p1, p2)}
= max{V k+1Bb (p2, p1), V k+1B2 (p2, p1), V k+1B1 (p2, p1)}
= V k+1(p2, p1). (21)
From the theory of MDPs, we know that V n(p1, p2) →
V (p1, p2) as n→∞. Hence we have V (p1, p2) = V (p2, p1),
for any (p1, p2) in the belief space.
B: Properties of the decision regions of policy pi∗
We use Φa to denote the set of beliefs for which it is optimal
to take the action a. That is,
Φa = {(p1, p2) ∈ ([0, 1], [0, 1]), V (p1, p2) = Va(p1, p2)},
a ∈ {Bb, B1, B2}. (22)
Definition 1. Φa is said to be contiguous along p1 dimen-
sion if we have (x1, p2) ∈ Φa and (x2, p2) ∈ Φa, then
∀x ∈ [x1, x2], we have (x, p2) ∈ Φa. Similarly, we say Φa
is contiguous along p2 dimension if we have (p1, y1) ∈ Φa
and (p1, y2) ∈ Φa, then ∀y ∈ [y1, y2], we have (p1, y) ∈ Φa.
Theorem 1. ΦBb is contiguous in both p1 and p2 dimensions.
ΦB1 is contiguous in p1 dimension, and ΦB2 is contiguous in
p2 dimension.
Proof: Here we will prove the theory for ΦB1, and the
results for ΦB2 and ΦBb can be proved in a similar manner.
Let (x1, p2), (x2, p2) ∈ ΦB1 , next we show that ((cx1 + (1−
c)x2), p2)) is also in region ΦB1 , where c ∈ [0, 1].
V ((cx1 + (1− c)x2), p2)
≤ cV (x1, p2) + (1− c)V (x2, p2)
= cVB1(x1, p2) + (1− c)VB1(x2, p2)
= VB1((cx1 + (1− c)x2), p2)
≤ V ((cx1 + (1− c)x2), p2), (23)
where the first inequality comes from the convexity of
V (p1, p2) in p1; the first equality follows from the fact that
(x1, p2), (x2, p2) ∈ ΦB1 ; the second equality comes from the
fact that VB1 is linear in p1 as in Lemma 1; the last inequality
follows from the definition of V (p1, p2). In the above equation,
we have V ((cx1+(1−c)x2), p2) = VB1((cx1+(1−c)x2), p2),
which means (cx1 + (1 − c)x2), p2) is in the region ΦB1,
therefore ΦB1 is contiguous in p1 dimension by definition 1.
Theorem 2. If belief (p1, p2) is in ΦB1 , then belief (p2, p1) is
in ΦB2 . In other words, the decision regions of B1 and B2 are
mirrors with respect to the line p1 = p2 in the belief space.
Proof: Let (p1, p2) be a belief state in the decision region
of B1, then we have
V (p1, p2) = max{VBb(p1, p2), VB1(p1, p2), VB2(p1, p2)}
= VB1(p1, p2). (24)
Using equations (6),(8) and (9),we have
VB1(p1, p2)
= p1Rh + β[(1− p1)V (λ0, T (p2)) + p1V (λ1, T (p2))]
> VB2(p1, p2)
= p2Rh + β[(1− p2)V (T (p1), λ0) + p2V (T (p1), λ1)],
(25)
and
VB1(p1, p2)
> VBb(p1, p2)
= p1Rl + p2Rl + β[(1− p1)(1− p2)V (λ0, λ0)
+ p1(1− p2)V (λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)p2V (λ0, λ1)
+ p1p2V (λ1, λ1)]. (26)
Now consider the belief state of (p2, p1),
VB2(p2, p1)
= p1Rh + β[(1− p1)V (T (p2), λ0) + p1V (T (p2), λ1)]
= VB1(p1, p2)
> VB2(p1, p2)
= p2Rh + β[(1− p2)V (T (p1), λ0) + p2V (T (p1), λ1)]
= VB1(p2, p1), (27)
where the second and last equations follow by comparing the
expression in equation (25) and using the fact that V (p1, p2) =
V (p2, p1) (Lemma 3). Similarly, from (26) and Lemma 3, we
have
VB2(p2, p1) > VBb(p2, p1). (28)
Thus we have
V (p2, p1) = max{VBb(p2, p1), VB1(p2, p1), VB2(p2, p1)}
= VB2(p2, p1), (29)
which means (p2, p1) lies in the decision region of B2, that
is, (p2, p1) ∈ ΦB2 . This concludes the proof.
Theorem 3. If belief (p1, p2) is in ΦBb , then belief (p2, p1) is
in ΦBb . That is, the decision region of Bb is symmetric with
respect to the line p1 = p2 in the belief region.
Proof: Suppose (p1, p2) is in ΦBb , then we have
V (p1, p2) = max{VBb(p1, p2), VB1(p1, p2), VB2(p1, p2)}
= VBb(p1, p2) (30)
Now consider the belief state (p2, p1),
VBb(p2, p1)
= p2Rl + p1Rl + β[(1− p2)(1− p1)V (λ0, λ0)
+ p2(1− p1)V (λ1, λ0) + (1− p2)p1V (λ0, λ1)
+ p2p1V (λ1, λ1)]
= VBb(p1, p2)
> VB1(p1, p2)
= p1Rh + β[(1− p1)V (λ0, T (p2)) + p1V (λ1, T (p2))]
= VB2(p2, p1), (31)
where the equations follow from (6), (8), (9) and Lemma 3.
The inequality comes from the assumption that (p1, p2) is in
ΦBb . Similarly, we have VBb(p2, p1) > VB1(p2, p1). That is,
V (p2, p1) = max{VBb(p2, p1), VB1(p2, p1), VB2(p2, p1)}
= VBb(p2, p1). (32)
That is, (p2, p1) is in ΦBb . And this concludes the proof.
Lemma 4. After each channel is used once, the belief state
is the four sides of a rectangle determined by four vertices at
(λ0, λ0), (λ0, λ1), (λ1, λ0), (λ1, λ1) (Figure 1 (a)).
Proof: From the belief update in (6)(8)(9), it is clear that
the belief state of a channel is updated to one of the following
three values after any action: λ0, λ1, or T (p), where p is the
Fig. 1. (a) The feasible belief space. (b) The threshold on p1 ( p2 = λ0(λ1)).
current belief of a channel. For any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, λ0 ≤ T (p) =
λ0 + (λ1− λ0)p ≤ λ1. Therefore the belief state of a channel
is between λ0 and λ1.
Furthermore, since at least one channel is used in our power
allocation strategy, its channel state is revealed at the end of
the time slot. This means at least one of the channel has a
belief of either λ0 or λ1. And this concludes the proof.
Theorem 4. Let p1 ∈ [λ0, λ1], p2 = λ0, there exists a thresh-
old ρ1(λ0 ≤ ρ1 ≤ λ1) such that ∀p1 ∈ [λ0, ρ1], (p1, λ0) ∈
ΦBb . (Figure 1(b))
Proof: We introduce the following sets
Φp2=λ0a = {(p1 ∈ [λ0, λ1], λ0), V (p1, λ0) = Va(p1, λ0)},
a ∈ {Bb, B1, B2}. (33)
We will first prove that Φp2=λ0Bb and Φ
p2=λ0
B1
are convex, which
is important to prove the structure of the optimal policy. When
p2 = λ0, VBb(p1, p2) is rewritten as
VBb(p1, λ0)
= p1Rl + λ0Rl + β[(1− p1)(1− λ0)V (λ0, λ0)
+ p1(1− λ0)V (λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)λ0V (λ0, λ1)
+ p1λ0V (λ1, λ1)]
= p1[Rl − β(1− λ0)V (λ0, λ0)− βλ0V (λ1, λ0)
− βλ0V (λ0, λ1) + λ0V (λ1, λ1)] + λ0Rl
+ β(1− λ0)V (λ0, λ0) + βλ0V (λ0, λ1). (34)
From equation (34) it is easy to see that VBb(p1, λ0) is linear
in p1. Let (x1, λ0), (x2, λ0) ∈ Φp2=λ0Bb and let c ∈ [0, 1] then
we have
V (cx1 + (1− c)x2, λ0)
≤ cV (x1, λ0) + (1− c)V (x2, λ0)
= cVBb(x1, λ0) + (1− c)VBb(x2, λ0)
= VBb(ax1 + (1− c)x2, λ0)
≤ V (cx1 + (1− c)x2, λ0), (35)
where the first inequality comes from the convexity of
V (p1, λ0); the first equality follows from the fact that
(x1, λ0), (x2, λ0) ∈ Φp2=λ0Bb , and the second equality from the
linearity of VBb(p1, λ0); the last inequality comes from the
definition of V (·). Consequently, VBb(cx1 + (1− c)x2, λ0) =
V (cx1+(1−c)x2, λ0), hence (cx1+(1−c)x2, λ0) ∈ Φp2=λ0Bb ,
which proves the convexity of Φp2=λ0Bb . Since convex subsets
of the real line are intervals and (λ0, λ0) ∈ Φp2=λ0Bb (from
the fact that ΦBb is symmetric), there exists ρ1 ∈ [λ0, λ1]
such that Φp2=λ0Bb = [λ0..ρ1, λ0] (Figure 1(b)). In other words,∀p1 ∈ [λ0, ρ1], (p1, λ0) ∈ ΦBb . And this concludes the proof.
Theorem 5. Let p1 ∈ [λ0, λ1], p2 = λ1, there exists a thresh-
old ρ2(λ0 ≤ ρ2 ≤ λ1) such that ∀p1 ∈ [ρ2, λ1], (p1, λ1) ∈
ΦBb . (Figure 1(b))
Proof: Similar to proof of theorem 4, we can show that
Φp2=λ1Bb is convex, therefore it is an interval on p2 = λ1. Now
since (λ1, λ1) is in ΦBb from the fact that ΦBb is symmetric,
there exists a threshold ρ2, such that ∀p1 ∈ [ρ2, λ1], (p1, λ1) ∈
ΦBb .
Lemma 5. In case of p2 = λ0, it is not optimal to take action
B2. In case of p2 = λ1, it is not optimal to take action B1.
Proof: In case of p2 = λ0, we need to prove that it is not
optimal to take action B2, i.e.
VB2(p1, λ0) ≤ VBb(p1, λ0) or
VB2(p1, λ0) ≤ VB1(p1, λ0). (36)
If one of the above inequalities holds, then the proof is
complete. Because among three options, B2 would be second
or third then it’s not optimal. We will prove the first inequality
as follows:
VB2(p1, λ0) = Rhλ0 + βλ0V (T (p1), λ1)
+ β(1− λ0)V (T (p1), λ0).
VBb(p1, λ0) = Rlλ0 +Rlp1 + βλ0p1V (λ1, λ1)
+ β(1− λ0)p1V (λ1, λ0) + βλ0(1− p1)V (λ0, λ1)
+ β(1− λ0)(1− p1)V (λ0, λ0). (37)
Then we have:
VBb(p1, λ0)− VB2(p1, λ0)
= [Rlp1 − (Rh −Rl)λ0]
+ βλ0[p1V (λ1, λ1) + (1− p1)V (λ0, λ1)− V (T (p1), λ1)]
+ β(1− λ0)[p1V (λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)V (λ0, λ0)
− V (T (p1), λ0)].
(38)
For the first term of (38) we have:
Rlp1 − (Rh −Rl)λ0 ≥ λ0[2Rl −Rh] ≥ 0. (39)
In the above inequality, we use the fact that p1 ≥ λ0 and
Rh < 2Rl.
Assume that at point (T (p1), λ1), the action Bi, i ∈ {1, 2, b}
is optimal. Then for the second term of (38), we have:
p1V (λ1, λ1) + (1− p1)V (λ0, λ1)− V (T (p1), λ1)
= p1V (λ1, λ1) + (1− p1)V (λ0, λ1)− VBi(T (p1), λ1)
≥ p1VBi(λ1, λ1) + (1− p1)VBi(λ0, λ1)− VBi(T (p1), λ1)
= VBi(p1λ1 + (1− p1)λ0, λ1)− VBi(T (p1), λ1)
= VBi(T (p1), λ1)− VBi(T (p1), λ1) = 0.
(40)
The first inequality above is achieved from the fact that V ≥
VBi , i ∈ {1, 2, b} and the equality after the inequality is from
the linearity of VBi , i ∈ {1, 2, b} as in Lemma 1.
Similarly, for the third term of (38), assume that at point
(T (p1), λ0), the action Bj is optimal. Then we have:
p1V (λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)V (λ0, λ0)− V (T (p1), λ0)
= p1V (λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)V (λ0, λ0)− VBj (T (p1), λ0)
≥ p1VBj (λ1, λ0) + (1− p1)VBj (λ0, λ0)− VBj (T (p1), λ0)
= VBj (p1λ1 + (1− p1)λ0, λ0)− VBj (T (p1), λ0)
= VBj (T (p1), λ0)− VBj (T (p1), λ0) = 0.
(41)
Now using (39), (40) and (41) in (38), we have:
VBb(p1, λ0)− VB2(p1, λ0) ≥ 0. (42)
(42) means that B2 never can be optimal on the border of
(p1, λ0).
Similar arguments can be used to prove that VB1(p1, λ1) ≤
VBb(p1, λ1), thus B1 is not optimal on the border of (p1, λ1).
Then the proof is complete.
C: The structure of the optimal policy
Theorem 6. The optimal policy has a simple threshold struc-
ture and can be described as follows (Figure 2):
pi∗(p1, λ0) =
{
Bb, if λ0 ≤ p1 ≤ ρ1
B1, if ρ1 < p1 ≤ λ1 , (a)
pi∗(p1, λ1) =
{
Bb, if ρ2 ≤ p1 ≤ λ1
B2, if λ0 ≤ p1 < ρ2 , (b)
pi∗(λ0, p2) =
{
Bb, if λ0 ≤ p2 ≤ ρ1
B2, if ρ1 < p2 ≤ λ1 , (c)
pi∗(λ1, p2) =
{
Bb, if ρ2 ≤ p2 ≤ λ1
B1, if λ0 ≥ p2 < ρ1 . (d)
(43)
Proof: Let us first consider the border of (p1, λ0). From
Lemma 5 we understand that on this border B2 is not optimal,
therefore the optimal action can only be Bb or B1. Furthermore
from Theorem 4 we know that the decision region on this
border for Bb is the interval represented by λ0 ≤ p1 ≤ ρ1,
it follows directly that the remaining part of this border must
belong to the decision region of B1. Thus we have (43)(a).
(43)(b) specifies the optimal action on the border of (p1, λ1).
Similar to the (43)(a), it is directly obtained from Theorem 5
and Lemma 5.
Fig. 2. Structure of optimal policy.
(43)(c) specifies the optimal action on the border of (λ0, p2).
It is directly obtained based on the result on the border of
(p1, λ0) (i.e. (43) (a)) using Theorems 2 and 3. Specifically,
from Theorem 3 we know that the decision region of Bb is
symmetric with respect to the line p1 = p2, thus we have the
first term of (43)(c) from the first term of (43)(a). Similarly,
from Theorem 2 we know the decision regions of B1 and B2
are mirrors with respect to the line p1 = p2, therefore we get
the second term of (43)(c) from the second term of (43)(a).
(43)(d) specifies the optimal action on the border of (λ1, p2).
It is directly obtained based on the result on the border of
(p1, λ1) (i.e. (43) (b)) using Theorems 2 and 3.
From the above analysis we understand that the optimal
policy has a simple threshold structure. And it is critical to
find the two thresholds ρ1 and ρ2.
Theorem 7. Let δi,j(k1, k2) = VBi(k1, k2)−VBj (k1, k2), (i ∈
{1, 2, b}, j ∈ {1, 2, b}), ρ1 can be calculated as follows
1) if T (λ0) < ρ2, T (λ0) ≤ ρ1
ρ1 =
λ0Rl + βλ0δ2,b(λ0, λ1)
Rh −Rl + βλ0(δ1,b(λ1, λ1) + δ2,b(λ0, λ1)) , (44)
2) if T (λ0) < ρ2, T (λ0) > ρ1
ρ1 =
λ0Rl + β(1− λ0)δb,2(λ0, λ0)
Rh −Rl + βλ0δ1,b(λ1, λ1) + β(1− λ0)δb,2(λ0, λ0) ,
(45)
3) if T (λ0) ≥ ρ2, T (λ0) ≤ ρ1
ρ1 =
λ0Rl + βλ0δ2,b(λ0, λ1)
Rh −Rl + βλ0δ2,b(λ0, λ1) + β(1− λ0)δb,1(λ1, λ0) ,
(46)
4) if T (λ0) ≥ ρ2, T (λ0) > ρ1, ρ1 is calculated in (47).
Proof: We will prove (44) and the rest of the theorem
can be shown in a similar manner. From Theorem 6 we know
that at the point (ρ1, λ0)
VB1(ρ1, λ0) = VBb(ρ1, λ0). (48)
Using (8) and (6), the above is written as
ρ1Rh + ρ1βV (λ1, T (λ0)) + (1− ρ1)βV (λ0, T (λ0)) =
ρ1Rl + λ0Rl + βρ1λ0V (λ1, λ1) + β(1− ρ1)λ0V (λ0, λ1)
+βρ1(1− λ0)V (λ1, λ0) + β(1− ρ1)(1− λ0)V (λ0, λ0).
(49)
From Theorem 6 and the condition that T (λ0) < ρ2,
T (λ0) ≤ ρ1, we have V (λ1, T (λ0)) = VB1(λ1, T (λ0)),
V (λ0, T (λ0)) = VBb(λ0, T (λ0)) under the assumption that
ρ1 ≥ T (λ0), V (λ1, λ1) = VBb(λ1, λ1), V (λ0, λ1) =
VB2(λ0, λ1), V (λ1, λ0) = VB1(λ1, λ0), V (λ0, λ0) =
VBb(λ0, λ0).
Thus (49) can be written as
ρ1Rh + ρ1βVB1(λ1, T (λ0)) + (1− ρ1)βVBb(λ0, T (λ0)) =
ρ1Rl + λ0Rl + βρ1λ0VBb(λ1, λ1) + β(1− ρ1)λ0VB2(λ0, λ1)
+βρ1(1− λ0)VB1(λ1, λ0) + β(1− ρ1)(1− λ0)VBb(λ0, λ0).
(50)
Using the linearity of VB1 and VBb in p2, and the fact that
T (λ0) = λ0λ1 + (1− λ0)λ0, we have
VB1(λ1, T (λ0)) = λ0VB1(λ1, λ1) + (1− λ0)VB1(λ1, λ0),
VBb(λ0, T (λ0)) = λ0VBb(λ0, λ1) + (1− λ0)VBb(λ0, λ0). (51)
Substitute VB1(λ1, T (λ0)) and VBb(λ0, T (λ0)) in (50) with
(51), with simple manipulation we have formula (44).
Theorem 8. Let δi,j(k1, k2) = VBi(k1, k2)−VBj (k1, k2), (i ∈
{1, 2, b}, j ∈ {1, 2, b}), the threshold ρ2 is calculated as
follows
1) if T (ρ2) ≥ ρ2 and T (ρ2) > ρ1
ρ2 =
λ1(Rh −Rl)− βλ1δ2,b(λ0, λ1)− β(1− λ1)δb,1(λ0, λ0)
Rl − βλ1δ2,b(λ0, λ1)− β(1− λ1)δb,1(λ0, λ0) ,
(52)
2) if T (ρ2) ≥ ρ2 and T (ρ2) ≤ ρ1
ρ2 =
λ1(Rh −Rl)− βλ1δ2,b(λ0, λ1))
Rl − βλ1δ2,b(λ0, λ1)− β(1− λ1)δb,1(λ1, λ0) , (53)
3) if T (ρ2) < ρ2, T (ρ2) > ρ1
ρ2 =
λ1(Rh −Rl)− β(1− λ1)δb,1(λ0, λ0))
Rl − βλ1δ2,b(λ1, λ1)− β(1− λ1)δb,1(λ0, λ0) , (54)
4) if T (ρ2) < ρ2, T (ρ2) ≤ ρ1
ρ2 =
λ1(Rh −Rl)
Rl − βλ1δ2,b(λ1, λ1)− β(1− λ1)δb,1(λ1, λ0) . (55)
The proof of this theorem is similar to that of theorem 7
and is omitted here.
IV. SIMULATION BASED ON LINEAR PROGRAMMING
Linear programming is one of the approaches to solve the
Bellman’s equation in (4). Based on [14], we model our
problem as the following linear program:
min
∑
p∈X
V (p),
s.t. ga(p) + β
∑
y∈X
fa(p,y)V (y) ≤ V (p),
∀p ∈ X,∀a ∈ Ap, (56)
where X is the space of belief state, Ap is the set of available
actions for state p. The state transition probabilities fa(p,y)
ρ1 =
λ0Rl + βλ0δ2,1(λ0, λ1) + β(1− λ0)δb,1(λ0, λ0)
Rh −Rl + βλ0δ2,1(λ0, λ1) + β(1− λ0)(δb,1(λ1, λ0) + δb,1(λ0, λ0)) . (47)
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Fig. 4. Optimal policy.
is the probability that the next state will be y given that the
current state is p and the current action is a ∈ Ap. The optimal
policy can be generated according to
pi(p) = arg max
a∈Ap
(ga(p) + β
∑
y∈X
fa(p,y)V (y)). (57)
We used the LOQO solver on NEOS Server [15] with
AMPL input [16] to obtain the solution of equation (56).
Then we used MATLAB to construct the policy according
to equation (57).
Figure 3 shows the AMPL solution of value function for
the following set of parameters: λ0 = 0.1, λ1 = 0.9, β =
0.9, Rl = 2, Rh = 3. The corresponding optimal policy is
shown in Figure 4. The structure of the policy in Figure 4
clearly shows the properties we gave in Theorems 1 to 5.
In order to observe the effect of parameters λ0, λ1, Rl and
Rh on the structure of optimal policy, we have conducted sim-
ulation experiments for varying parameters. First, we increase
λ0 from 0.1 to 0.7, keeping the rest of the parameters the same
as in the above experiment. Figure 5 shows the policy structure
with different λ0. We can observe in Figure 5 that when λ0
increases from 0.1 to 0.3, the decision region of action Bb
Fig. 5. Optimal policy with increasing λ0 (Rl = 2, Rh = 3) .
Fig. 6. Optimal policy with increasing λ0 (Rl = 2, Rh = 3.8).
occupies a bigger part of the belief space. Whilst when λ0
is 0.5 or greater, the whole belief space falls in the decision
region of action Bb, meaning that it is optimal to always use
both channels in the set of this experiment when λ0 > 0.5.
Intuitively we believe the optimal policy is closely related
to the immediate reward of the three actions. Therefore, in
the next experiment, we set Rh to 3.8 (2 = Rl < Rh =
3.8 < 2Rl) and repeat the above experiment, and the result is
shown in Figure 6. Compared to Figure 5, the most obvious
difference is that there is no zero-threshold policy structure in
Figure 6. This is because when the immediate reward of using
one channel is greater (bigger Rh ), it is more beneficial to
use one channel than using both channels.
Fig. 7. Optimal policy with decreasing λ1 (Rl = 2, Rh = 3.8).
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Fig. 8. Normalized threshold ρ1 and ρ2 with different β. (λ0 = 0.1, λ1 =
0.9)
Figure 7 shows the structure of optimal policy when λ1 de-
creases from 0.9 to 0.15. Other parameters in this experiment
are: λ0 = 0.1, Rl = 2, Rh = 3, β = 0.9. As in Figure 5, both
two-threshold and zero threshold policies are observed in this
experiment.
From the above observation we understand that the thresh-
olds are sensitive to the value of Rl and Rh. Therefore, next we
try to observe the relationship between the thresholds and the
value of Rl and Rh. Figure 8 shows the normalized thresholds
ρ1 and ρ2 versus the ratio of Rh and Rl, with different discount
factor β, when λ0 = 0.1, λ1 = 0.9. ρ1 is normalized as
(ρ1−λ0)/(λ1−λ0), representing the relative length of Φp2=λ0Bb .
Similarly, the normalized ρ2, that is, (λ1 − ρ2)/(λ1 − λ0), is
the relative length of Φp2=λ1Bb . It is clear to see that when the
normalized threshold ρ1 is 1 (ρ2 is also 1), it corresponds to
the zero threshold structure of the optimal policy. From Figure
8 we can also observe that the structure of the optimal policy
is affected by the value of the discount factor β.
Figure 9 shows the normalized threshold ρ1 and ρ2 with
different values of λ0 and λ1. Figure 9 gives us a whole
picture of the structure of the optimal policy for different
Rh/Rl and different size of the belief space. We can see
that in all experiments with a wide range of parameters, no
other policy structure than zero-threshold and two-threshold
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Fig. 9. Normalized threshold ρ1 and ρ2. (β = 0.8)
structure is observed. So we can conclude that with the help
of linear-programming simulation, once the five parameters are
known (λ0, λ1, Rl, Rh, β), the thresholds can be derived based
on Figure 9 and the exact optimal policy can be constructed.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown the structure of the optimal
policy by theoretical analysis and simulation. Knowing that
this problem has a 0 or 2 threshold structure reduces the
problem of identifying optimal performance to finding the
(only up to 2) threshold parameters. In settings where the
underlying state transition matrices are unknown, this could
be exploited by using a multiarmed bandit (MAB) formulation
to find the best possible thresholds (similar to the ideas in the
papers [9] and [10]). Also, we would like to investigate the
case of non-identical channels, and derive useful results for
more than 2 channels, possibly in the form of computing the
Whittle index [17], if computing the optimal policy in general
turns out to be intractable.
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